

Message Text

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AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK POUCH

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FROM US REP MBFR

USSALTTWO

BELGRADE ALSO FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP REPORT TO NAC MINISTERS

AT ITS NOVEMBER 30 MEETING, THE AD HOC GROUP APPROVED THE
TEXT OF THE REPORT ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE MBFR
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NEGOTIATIONS TO BE SENT TO THE NAC FOR THE DECEMBER NATO
MINISTERIAL MEETING. THE TEXT OF THE REPORT FOLLOWS BELOW.

BEGIN TEXT:

I. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

1. THIS REPORT BY THE AD HOC GROUP ON THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS COVERS THE PERIOD FROM THE BEGINNING OF MAY 1977 TO 1 DECEMBER 1977.

2. DURING THIS PERIOD, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS IN VIENNA HAVE CONCENTRATED ON AN ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY OF ABOUT 176,000 MEN BETWEEN THE FIGURE OF 987,000 TABLED BY THE EAST ON 10 JUNE 1976 FOR THE TOTAL PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF WARSAW PACT GROUND AND AIR FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AS OF 1 JANUARY 1976 AND THE LATEST NATO AGREED ESTIMATE THAT THESE WARSAW PACT FORCES COMPRISED A TOTAL OF 1,163,000 MEN.

3. IT HAS BEEN CLEAR SINCE MARCH OF THIS YEAR THAT IDENTIFYING THE SOURCES OF THIS LARGE DISCREPANCY WOULD REQUIRE SUBDIVISION OF THE DATA PREVIOUSLY INTRODUCED BY THE EAST IN ORDER TO CREATE A BASIS FOR A DETAILED COMPARISON BY WESTERN EXPERTS BETWEEN WESTERN DATA ON PACT FORCES AND WARSAW PACT DATA ON PACT FORCES. AS A FIRST STEP, THE WEST HAS TO OBTAIN ENOUGH DETAILED DATA FROM THE EAST TO OBTAIN A PROFILE OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE DISCREPANCY AMONG WARSAW PACT FORCES AND OF ITS EXTENT IN EACH CASE. SINCE MARCH, EASTERN AND WESTERN REPS HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN AN INTENSIVE DISCUSSION OF A SERIES OF PROPOSALS PRESENTED BY BOTH SIDES WITH A VIEW TO REACHING AGREEMENT ON A METHOD OF DISAGGREGATION TO BE USED AS THE BASIS FOR THE EXCHANGE OF FURTHER DATA. (DETAILS IN ANNEX A).

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4. THE QUESTION OF SUBMITTING FURTHER DETAILED FIGURES WAS STILL NOT SETTLED AS OF 1 DECEMBER. HOWEVER, A MEASURE OF EAST-WEST AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON A METHOD OF EXCHANGE WHICH CONTAINS MANY IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD BY THE WEST ON 15 JULY. THE MAJOR OUTSTANDING ISSUES CONCERN (A) THE EAST'S EFFORTS TO LIMIT THE RIGHT OF THE WEST TO ASK FOR FURTHER DETAILED DATA IN THE FUTURE AND (B) THE MODALITIES OF EXCHANGE OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER DATA.

5. WHILE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO MAKE A DEFINITIVE FORECAST, THE POSSIBILITY REMAINS THAT THESE ISSUES MIGHT BE RESOLVED THROUGH A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE EASTERN POSITION IN TIME TO PERMIT A FURTHER EXCHANGE OF DATA BEFORE THE CURRENT NEGOTIATING ROUND REACHES ITS SCHEDULED END ON DECEMBER 15.

6. PARALLEL WITH THE DISCUSSION OF DATA, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS HAVE CONTINUED TO PRESS FOR EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE WESTERN APPROACH TO REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS. IN THIS REGARD, IT IS THE CONSENSUS OF THE AD HOC GROUP THAT THE NEW WESTERN INITIATIVE NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION AT NATO COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE ATTAINMENT OF OVERALL WESTERN GOALS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS,

INCLUDING ULTIMATE AGREEMENT ON A DATA BASE FOR REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS. THE GROUP BELIEVES THAT, FROM A TACTICAL POINT OF VIEW, IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE WEST TO HAVE THIS INITIATIVE APPROVED BY THE COUNCIL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SO THAT IT IS READY FOR PRESENTATION IN VIENNA AT A TIME WHICH THE COUNCIL CONSIDERS APPROPRIATE.

7. DESPITE SOME LIMITED INDICATIONS OF FLEXIBILITY IN THE EASTERN POSITION (SEE ANNEX) THE CURRENT EASTERN TACTIC IN THE NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUES TO BE ONE OF MARKING TIME. WESTERN PRESS LEAKS HAVE LED EASTERN NEGOTIATORS TO CONSIDER THAT AN INITIATIVE WILL BE PRESENTED IN VIENNA IN THE RELATIVELY NEAR FUTURE. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT WOULD SEEM UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT A MORE FORTHCOMING EASTERN ATTITUDE ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
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UNTIL THE WEST PUTS FORWARDS ITS NEW PROPOSALS.

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ANNEX A

CHRONOLOGY OF SPECIFIC DEVELOPMENTS IN THE VIENNA TALKS

A. DATA DISCUSSION

1. A DISCUSSION OF PREVIOUSLY TABLED DATA, AND OF THE COUNTING RULES USED RESPECTIVELY BY EAST AND WEST TO ASSEMBLE THAT DATA, ENSUED FOLLOWING THE INTRODUCTION BY THE WEST IN DECEMBER 1976 OF UPDATED MANPOWER FIGURES FOR AIR AND GROUND FORCES OF WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE REDUCTION AREA. BY MARCH OF THIS YEAR, THIS

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DISCUSSION MADE CLEAR THAT A FURTHER EXCHANGE OF MORE DETAILED DATA WOULD BE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCES OF THE LARGE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN FIGURES FOR THE PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF THE RELEVANT WARSAW PACT FORCES.

2. THE EAST SUGGESTED IN MARCH THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD EXCHANGE MANPOWER DATA ON A NATIONAL BASIS FOR THE FORCES IN THE AREA OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THE WEST PROPOSED THAT THE INITIAL DISAGGREGATION OF DATA SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO US AND SOVIET FORCES.

3. IN THE FACE OF DETERMINED EASTERN OPPOSITION TO THE LATTER PROPOSAL, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS PRESENTED ON JULY 15, ON INSTRUCTIONS OF THE COUNCIL, A NEW, MORE DETAILED DISAGGREGATION PROPOSAL. SPECIFICALLY, THEY PROPOSED THAT EACH SIDE TABLE DATA ON ITS GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL DIVIDED BETWEEN PERSONNEL SERVING IN INDIVIDUALLY DESIGNATED MAJOR FORMATIONS AND THE NATIONAL COMPONENTS OF ALL REMAINING PERSONNEL, WITH THE EXCEPTION THAT THE NUMBER OF GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO MULTILATERAL HEADQUARTERS WOULD BE SUBMITTED AS AN OVERALL TOTAL. ALLIED NEGOTIATORS FURTHER PROPOSED THAT AN ANALOGOUS PROCEDURE BE FOLLOWED TO DISAGGREGATE AIR FORCE MANPOEWER AFTER AN INITIAL DISCUSSION OF THE NEW GROUND FORCE FIGURES.

4. WHEN THE TALKS RESUMED IN SEPTEMBER, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES SAID THAT THE WEST'S 15 JULY PROPOSAL TO EXCHANGE DATA ON THE STRENGTHS OF ALL WESTERN AND WARSAW PACT MAJOR FORMATIONS WOULD REQUIRE THE RELEASE OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE OF WARSAW PACT ARMED FORCES, WHICH WAS BOTH EXTRANEIOUS TO THE NEEDS OF

THE NEGOTIATION AND RISKED NEEDLESSLY BOGGING PARTICIPANTS

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DOWN IN MATTERS OF DETAIL WITHOUT ANY GUARANTEE THAT EAST/WEST DIFFERENCES OVER DATA WOULD BE RESOLVED. WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES ARGUED THAT EXPERIENCE HAD SHOWN THAT PROGRESS IN THE DATA DISCUSSION WOULD REQUIRE MORE THAN THE EXCHANGE OF NATIONAL MANPOWER TOTALS ADVOCATED BY THE EAST AND THAT THE WESTERN DISAGGREGATION PROPOSAL WAS A BETTER MEANS FOR CLARIFYING THE REASONS FOR THE DATA DISCREPANCY.

5. ON 25 OCTOBER, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES PRESENTED THE EASTERN RESPONSE TO THE 15 JULY WESTERN DATA DISAGGREGATION PROPOSAL. THEY CHARACTERIZED THE EASTERN RESPONSE AS A COMPROMISE MOVE THAT TOOK INTO CONSIDERATION SUBSTANTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE WEST'S PROPOSAL EXCEPT FOR THE FORMATIONS, WHICH THE EAST COULD NOT POSSIBLY ACCEPT. INSTEAD, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS PROPOSED THAT THE WEST TABLE: (1) A TOTAL FOR THE GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL IN MAJOR UNITS, AS DEFINED BY THE WEST, OF EACH WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANT; (2) A TOTAL FOR THE GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL NOT IN MAJOR UNITS OF EACH WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANT; AND (3) A THIRD, COMPOSITE FIGURE FOR THE GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL OF ALL WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ASSIGNED TO NATO MULTILATERAL HEADQUARTERS IN THE AREA. THE EAST WOULD DO THE SAME EXCEPT THAT IT WOULD NOT TABLE A FIGURE FOR MULTILATERAL STAFF PERSONNEL AS THE EAST HAD NO SUCH PERSONNEL IN THE AREA. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES FURTHER PROPOSED THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN EXCHANGE OF ADDITIONAL DATA ON AIR FORCE PERSONNEL WHICH, THEY SAID, COULD COME AFTER THE EXCHANGE AND SOME DISCUSSION OF GROUND FORCE DATA. FINALLY, THEY ALSO PROPOSED THE EVENTUAL EXCHANGE OF DATA ON THE AVERAGE MANNING LEVEL OF THE GROUND FORCES OF EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT, BUT STATED THAT THIS STEP WAS NOT A CONDITION FOR THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE BALANCE OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL.

6. ON 9 NOVEMBER, WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES ON INSTRUCTIONS OF THE COUNCIL, INFORMED THE EAST OF THEIR READINESS TO PROCEED TO DISAGGREGATE DATA ON THE BASIS OF THE 15 JULY WESTERN PROPOSAL AND THE 25 OCTOBER EAST-SECRET

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ERN RESPONSE TO THAT PROPOSAL. ACCORDINGLY, WESTERN NEGOTIATORS WERE PREPARED TO PRESENT ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS THE FOLLOWING DATA VALID AS OF 1 JANUARY 1976: (1) THE OVERALL TOTAL OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN MAJOR FORMATIONS IN THE REDUCTION AREA OF WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND ALSO THE OVERALL TOTAL OF

GROUND FORCE MANPOWER OF THESE PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THAT

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CONTAINED IN THESE MAJOR FORMATIONS AND (2) A TOTAL FOR GROUND
FORCE MANPOWER FORMATIONS OF EACH WESTERN DIRECT
PARTICIPANT. WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES CONTINUED THAT THEY
WERE FURTHER PREPARED TO PRESENT (3) THE OVERALL FIGURES
FOR THE GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL OF WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS
ASSIGNED TO MULTILATERAL HEADQUARTERS IN THE AREA AND, ON A
RECIPROCAL BASIS (4) THE FIGURES FOR THE REMAINING GROUND FORCE
PERSONNEL IN THE AREA OF EACH WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANT.
WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES SUGGESTED THAT THIS EXCHANGE TAKE
PLACE PROMPTLY AND SAID THAT, AFTER TABLING AND DISCUSSION
OF GROUND FORCE DATA, THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO PRESENT ON A
RECIPROCAL BASIS DATA ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER DISAGGREGATED IN A
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SIMILAR MANNER.

7. ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE COUNCIL, WESTERN NEGOTIATORS STATED THAT, IN TAKING THIS MOVE, THE WESTERN JULY 15 PROPOSAL REMAINED ON THE TABLE. WESTERN PARTICIPANTS CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT IT PROVIDED THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY. THEY CONSIDERED THAT IT WAS LIKELY THAT FURTHER DISAGGREGATION OF DATA WOULD BE REQUIRED IN THE FUTURE TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY.

8. SUBSEQUENTLY, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES DECLINED TO EXCHANGE GROUND FORCE DATA PENDING (A) AGREEMENT ON THE MODALITIES OF EXCHANGING AIR FORCE DATA AND (B) UNEQUIVOCAL WESTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE 25 OCTOBER EASTERN PROPOSAL, BY WHICH THE EAST MEANS THE WEST'S AGREEMENT PRIOR TO EXCHANGE OF THIS DATA NOT TO ASK FOR FURTHER DATA ON THE EAST'S MAJOR FORMATIONS. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE, IN ADDITION, EMPHASIZED THEIR INTEREST IN THEIR PROPOSAL TO EXCHANGE AVERAGE MANNING LEVELS.

9. AS REGARDS EXCHANGE OF AIR FORCE DATA, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES SAID THAT THEIR 25 OCTOBER PROPOSAL ONLY ENVISAGED THE EXCHANGE OF A SINGLE FIGURE FOR THE TOTAL AIR FORCE MANPOWER OF EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT AND REQUESTED SIMULTANEOUS EXCHANGE OF GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER. A SOVIET NEGOTIATOR SUBSEQUENTLY INFORMALLY SUGGESTED THAT, AS REGARDS EXCHANGE OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER DATA THE FOLLOWING MODALITIES MIGHT BE CONSIDERED:

A. PARTICIPANTS WOULD AGREE THAT DATA ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER WOULD BE EXCHANGED ON THE BASIS ALREADY AGREED.

B. THEY WOULD AGREE THAT AIR FORCE MANPOWER DATA WOULD BE EXCHANGED WITHIN SEVERAL WEEKS OF EXCHANGE OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER DATA.

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C. THIS EXCHANGE OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER DATA COULD TAKE PLACE IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: THE WEST WOULD SUBMIT ITS AIR MANPOWER DATA ALONG THE LINES OF ITS NOVEMBER 9 PROPOSAL USING THE FORMULA ON MAJOR FORMATIONS WHICH WESTERN NEGOTIATORS HAD PRESENTED. THE EAST WOULD SUBMIT A SINGLE FIGURE FOR THE AIR MANPOWER OF EACH EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANT AS ENVISAGED IN ITS OCTOBER 25 PROPOSAL.

D. THE EAST WOULD AT THE SAME TIME AGREE AS PART OF THIS UNDERSTANDING ON EXCHANGE OF AIR MANPOWER DATA THAT IT WOULD IN THE FUTURE SUBDIVIDE ITS AIR MANPOWER FIGURES ACCORDING TO A FORMULA ON MAJOR FORMATIONS TO BE MUTUALLY AGREED.

E. THE EAST WOULD ALSO TAKE NOTE OF THE FORMULA WHICH WEST HAD SUGGESTED FOR THIS DISAGGREGATION AND AGREE TO STUDY IT.

10. THIS SOVIET NEGOTIATOR SAID THAT THE EAST WISHED TO OBTAIN CONCURRENCE OF CAPITALS ON THESE PROPOSALS. AS YET, THERE IS NO INDICATION OF WHAT THE REACTION WILL BE.

11. THE AD HOC GROUP CONSIDERS THAT, IF CONFIRMED BY EASTERN CAPITALS, THESE MODALITIES WOULD SATISFACTORILY MEET WESTERN REQUIREMENTS.

12. ALLIED NEGOTIATORS HAVE REFUSED AND WILL CONTINUE TO REFUSE TO RELINQUISH THEIR RIGHT TO ASK QUESTIONS ABOUT WARSAW PACT FORCES INCLUDING REQUESTS FOR FURTHER DATA AND QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO THE STRENGTHS OF INDIVIDUAL FORMATIONS.

13. CURRENTLY, THEREFORE, BOTH OF THESE ISSUES REMAIN OUTSTANDING. HOWEVER, THERE IS STILL A POSSIBILITY THAT THEY WILL BE RESOLVED IN TIME TO PERMIT, BEFORE THE END OF THE CURRENT ROUND, A FURTHER EXCHANGE OF DATA IN A MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH THAT PROPOSED BY THE WEST ON 15 JULY, AS MODIFIED BY THE 9 NOVEMBER WESTERN RESPONSE TO THE 25 OCTOBER EASTERN PROPOSAL.

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B. OTHER ISSUES:

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FROM US REP MBFR

USSALTTWO

BELGRADE ALSO FOR USDEL CSCE

14. THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE MOVEMENT ON OTHER ISSUES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, THERE WERE SOME INCONCLUSIVE INDICATIONS OF POSSIBLE EASTERN MOVEMENT TOWARD SEVERAL ASPECTS OF THE WESTERN POSITION:

(1) ALTHOUGH EASTERN REPS HAVE MAINTAINED THE OFFICIAL
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EASTERN POSITION THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD ENCOMPASS AN ACROSS-
THE-BOARD REDUCTION OF ALL MAJOR ARMAMENTS, EASTERN REPS HAVE
ALSO SAID THEY WERE NOT OPPOSED IN PRINCIPLE TO A MORE
SELECTIVE APPROACH TO THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS. THEY MAY HAVE
IN MIND THE FIVE TYPES OF ARMAMENTS MENTIONED IN THE EAST'S
PROPOSAL OF FEBRUARY 19, 1976, NAMELY, MAIN BATTLE TANKS,
NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT, OPERATIONAL/TACTICAL SURFACE-TO-SURFACE
MISSILE LAUNCHERS, SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE LAUNCHERS, AND
NUCLEAR WARHEADS. HOWEVER, THEY HAVE ALSO SAID THAT ALL DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS, THAT THEY
SHOULD DO SO PROPORTIONATELY TO THEIR MILITARY POTENTIAL, AND
THAT THE ARMAMENTS DESIGNATED FOR REDUCTION AND LIMITATION SHOULD
BE THE SAME ON EACH SIDE. EASTERN REPS HAVE ASSERTED THAT THE
CURRENT WESTERN APPROACH TO THE ISSUE OF ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS
WAS NEITHER SELECTIVE NOR EQUITABLE IN THAT THE WEST PROPOSED
TO REDUCE AND LIMIT ONLY A FEW, SPECIFIED US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS
WHILE EXPECTING THE EAST TO WITHDRAW A WHOLE SOVIET TANK
ARMY, WITH RESULTANT LIMITATIONS NOT ONLY ON TANKS, BUT ON ALL
ARMAMENTS OF SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA. THIS TOPIC IS
ADDRESSED IN THE WESTER INITIATIVE UNDER DISCUSSION IN NATO.

(2) WHILE CONTINUING TO ADVOCATE THE IMPOSITION OF NATIONAL
CEILINGS, EASTERN REPS HAVE TWICE ALLUDED IN PLENARY

STATEMENTS TO THE POSSIBILITY OF FINDING A SOLUTION WITHIN THE
CONTEXT OF SUCH NATIONAL CEILINGS TO THE PROBLEM OF MAINTAINING
THE OVERALL RESIDUAL FORCE RELATIONSHIP IN THE EVENT OF
SUBSEQUENT UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS ON ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER.
THESE STATEMENTS CAN BE CONSIDERED AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY THE
EAST THAT THE EAST'S APPROACH TO NATIONAL CEILINGS HAS TO DEAL
WITH THE PROBLEM THAT, IN ITS PRESENT FORM, IT WOULD REQUIRE
THE OVERALL LEVEL PERMITTED ONE SIDE TO BE LOWERED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH POSSIBLE UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS ON THAT SIDE.

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(3) WHILE REITERATING THE EASTERN REQUIREMENT FOR A BINDING
PRIOR GUARANTEE THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD REDUCE
THEIR FORCES, EASTERN REPS HAVE ALSO EXPRESSED READINESS TO
CONSIDER ANY ALTERNATIVE WESTERN PROPOSAL CONCERNING REDUCTION
COMMITMENTS TO BE UNDERTAKEN IN A FIRST STAGE BY NON-US WESTERN
DIRECT PARTICIPANTS REGARDING THEIR SECOND STAGE REDUCTIONS.
THIS TOPIC, TOO, IS ADDRESSED IN THE WESTERN INITIATIVE.

(4) AFTER AN EXPLICIT EASTERN STATEMENT AT THE END OF THE
LAST ROUND THAT THE EAST HAD REJECTED THE WEST'S DECEMBER 1975
NUCLEAR WITHDRAWAL PROPOSALS, EASTERN REPS HAVE IN THE CURRENT
ROUND ASKED A SERIES OF QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE PRACTICAL EFFECT
OF THE LIMITATIONS ENVISAGED IN THE DECEMBER 1975 WESTERN
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